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Abstract
We show the presence of genuine quantum structures in human language. The neo-Darwinian
evolutionary scheme is founded on a probability structure that satisfies the Kolmogorovian axioms, and as
a consequence cannot incorporate quantum-like evolutionary change. In earlier research we revealed
quantum structures in processes taking place in conceptual space. We argue that the presence of quantum
structures in language and the earlier detected quantum structures in conceptual change make the neo-
Darwinian evolutionary scheme strictly too limited for Evolutionary Epistemology. We sketch how we
believe that evolution in a more general way should be implemented in epistemology and conceptual
change, but also in biology, and how this view would lead to another relation between both biology and
epistemology.
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1. Introduction
In this article we will demonstrate the presence of quantum structures in language by proving
the violation of Bell’s inequalities2. Apart from any specific philosophical theory about
language, the presence of quantum structures in language is an interesting finding,
particularly to the community of scientists who study the structure of language, and also to
those who investigate the working of the human mind, language being one of the mind’s
major products. In addition to this first-order motivation – as  one could call it –, the search
for quantum structures in language was equally well guided by the aim of elaborating the
global worldviews construction program, which is the main theme of research in the Leo
Apostel Centre (CLEA) (Aerts, Apostel, De Moor et al. 1995; Apostel 1995). It is through its
relevance for the global worldviews construction program that the material presented in this
article becomes relevant for Evolutionary Epistemology (EE), certainly in the broad
interpretation that EE was given at the conference where we presented the material of this
article. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy defines EE thus:
EE is the attempt to address questions in the theory of knowledge from an evolutionary
point of view. It involves, in part, employing models and metaphors drawn from
evolutionary biology in the attempt to characterise and resolve issues arising in
epistemology and conceptual change. There are two interrelated but distinct programs
which go by the name EE. One focuses on the development of cognitive mechanisms in
animals and humans. This involves as straightforward extension of the biological theory
of evolution to those aspects or traits of animals which are biological substrates of
cognitive activity, e.g. their brains, sensory systems, motor systems, etc. This program
has been labelled EEM. The other program attempts to account for the evolution of
ideas, scientific theories, epistemic norms and culture in general by using models and
metaphors drawn from evolutionary biology, and it has been labelled EET.
EE is sometimes given a narrow meaning, according to which it is said to attempt to
model epistemology not merely in terms of biological evolution but rather in terms of the
neo-Darwinian version of biological evolution, basing itself on the assumption that it is this
neo-Darwinian version that can be transferred to epistemology. The broad meaning of EE is
that the inspiration for modelling epistemology remains biological evolution, but the neo-
Darwinian form of this biological evolution is considered to be just one of the possibilities.
Within the framework of our global worldviews construction program at CLEA we have
introduced the model of the layered structure of reality. This model assumes that the
existence of separate bodies of knowledge, i.e. scientific disciplines, concerning parts or
fragments of reality has its reasons. The disciplines in the theoretical sciences have not been
chosen in an arbitrary way but correspond to a layered organisation of reality itself. Reality
indeed shows itself to us in the form of layers. The first is a pre-material layer of elementary
particles and waves that are the subject matter of quantum physics. This is followed by a
material layer, studied by physics and chemistry. The next layers are those of life forms that
make up the field of study of biology, and of interacting life forms studied by sociology.
Finally, we have the psycho-cognitive layer, studied by psychology and cognitive science.
This layered structure is considered effective and real and not merely a suitable classification.
On the other hand, it is clear that the different layers are not separated, but in constant
interaction and connected in all kinds of ways, i.e. through contextual, emergent, and
downward causation influences. They are forms of condensation in reality as an undivided
totality. The study of this multi-layered structure of reality, of how the different layers are
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2.4).
interconnected, how they emerge one from another, et cetera, is one of the encompassing
research themes in CLEA.
The way in which the psycho-cognitive layer of reality is considered a part of this layered
structure shows that we advocate a naturalised epistemology within this approach.
Epistemology is considered to be one of the processes that take place within the psycho-
cognitive layer of reality. As such, this layered structure is considered to have grown under
the influence of evolution, so that the approach followed at CLEA is compatible with the
broad meaning of EE. As we will see in the following, the detection of quantum structures in
the psycho-cognitive layer, more specifically in language, makes it possible for us to
formulate a criticism of the narrow meaning of EE. The neo-Darwinian view on evolution is
in fact a classical view, also if we use the word classical as opposed to quantum, i.e. in the
way it is used by physicists. The reason is that the two basic mechanisms of neo-Darwinian
evolution, namely variation and selection, on which the whole view is founded, turn the
resulting evolution mechanism into a classical mechanics mechanism. The identification of
quantum structures in what we have called the psycho-cognitive layer proves the neo-
Darwinian scheme to be too limited for modelling evolution in this layer. To explain in a
more concrete way why and how the neo-Darwinian scheme is too limited, we need to
introduce new concepts and explain results of foregoing research. We will do this along with
an exposition of different but compatible findings of quantum structures in the psycho-
cognitive layer in the sections to come.
2. Quantum vs classical probability
To clarify the nature of the shortcoming of the neo-Darwinian scheme for evolution that we
intend to reveal, we need to explain the difference between classical probability and quantum
probability.
2.1. The nature of classical probability
Microscopic physical particles are described by quantum mechanics, which is an
indeterministic theory. This means that for a quantum experiment the quantum entity can be
prepared in a state such that the outcome of the measurement is not predictable with
certainty. Of course, indeterminism of a specific set of experimental setups is not strictly
reserved to the micro-world, since indeterminism as a phenomenon related to a specific
experiment or set of experiments occurs regularly in the macro-world as well, e.g. the
problem of forecasting the weather, which is studied in chaos and complexity theories.
Another example is how in the field of population dynamics (Hoppensteadt 1982) change is
described by Markovian chain processes (Markov 1906; Doob 1953) using discrete time such
that at each moment the state of the system is completely defined by the previous state.
Hence classical indeterminism emerges in situations in which the observer lacks knowledge
about the specific state of an underlying deterministic world. In a classical world, no
indeterminism is involved on this deepest level of reality.
2.2. Hidden variable theories for quantum mechanics
The structure of indeterminism encountered in quantum mechanics is of a completely
different and new nature which has, at first sight at least, no counterpart in the macro-world.
John von Neumann (von Neumann 1932) proved that a hypothetical classical underlying
theory yielding the probabilities of quantum mechanics as due to a lack of knowledge of the
state would never be able to produce the correct numerical probabilities as the ones
encountered in quantum mechanics. The hypothetical classical theories considered by von
Neumann have been called hidden variable theories, because they introduce extra variables
such that when all these variables are known every outcome of every experiment can be
predicted, and hence the theory is classical deterministic. However, these extra variables are
hidden, which means that we do lack knowledge on their values, and it is this lack of
knowledge that gives rise to probabilities, and hence a classical type of probability.
John Bell remarked that one of the assumptions3 made by von Neumann does not need to
be satisfied for any hidden variable theory, and Bell built on the spot a hidden variable model
for a specific quantum system (Bell 1966). However, Bell’s hidden variable model was a
very theoretical model, making it impossible to establish the physical meaning of the hidden
variable and hence to determine the wrong assumption in von Neumann’s no-go theorem.
2.3. Classical versus quantum probabilities: the structural difference
The different nature of quantum and classical indeterminism is expressed by a deep structural
difference of a mathematical nature between the probability model of classical mechanics
and that of quantum mechanics. Classical probability theory was axiomatised and elaborated
into a formal mathematical theory by Kolmogorov in 1933 (Kolmogorov 1950). The
probability model that appears in situations described by classical mechanics – in which the
probability is due to a lack of knowledge about the state of the physical entity under
consideration – satisfies these axioms of Kolmogorov, and it is called a Kolmogorovian
probability model. The probability model that appears in quantum mechanics does not satisfy
the axioms of Kolmogorov (Foulis and Randall 1972; Accardi 1984; Gudder 1988; Pitowsky
1989), such that quantum probability cannot be explained as being due to a lack of
knowledge about the state of the system. It is this non-Kolmogorovian nature of the quantum
probability model that was already at the core of the proof of John von Neumann’s no-go
theorem. This was to appear with greater emphasis yet in later corroborations of von
Neumann’s no-go theorem (Jauch and Piron 1963; Kochen and Specker 1967; Gudder 1968).
2.4. Bell’s inequalities and Kolmogorovian probability models
In 1964, Bell analyzed the physical situation presented in the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paper
(Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935) and derived the first formulation of what we now know
as Bell’s inequalities (Bell 1964). Bell’s inequalities are a set of mathematical inequalities
formulated by means of expectation values of outcomes of experiments. Bell proves that
when there is a local hidden variable model for the considered quantum entity, the
expectation values predicted for the considered experiments and appearing in Bell’s
inequalities will be such that the inequalities are not violated. By contrast, quantum
mechanics predicts that the inequalities will be violated. All of the many experiments that
were executed yielded highly convincing evidence of Bell’s inequalities being violated in the
very way predicted by quantum mechanics (Clauser and Shimony 1978; Aspect 1999). By
introducing the violation versus non-violation of Bell’s inequalities principle, Bell offered an
operational manner of establishing whether the probability model of a system could be
explained from a lack of knowledge about an underlying deterministic world. Pitowsky
proved that a probability model is Kolmogorovian if and only if none of the Bell-type
inequalities that can be defined by means of expectation values of correlations between
different joint measurements of the relevant set of measurements are violated. This means
that the detection of a single Bell’s inequality being violated suffices to render the collection
of probabilities incompatible with a Kolmogorovian structure (Pitowsky 1989). Before that,
Luigi Accardi (Accardi 1984) had already proved a similar result in a different setting, which
was, however, less easy to generalise.
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the linear combination of the expectation values.
2.5. The violation of Bell’s inequalities in different layers of reality
A situation giving rise to the violation of Bell’s inequalities with measurements on a
macroscopic physical entity was considered in Aerts (1982). This model was proven to entail
a non-Kolmogorovian probability model, albeit that its non-Kolmogorovian aspect derived
from the introduction of a classical lack of knowledge probability into the measuring
apparatuses used in the example. The contextually driven mechanism identified as causing
the probability model to acquire a non-Kolmogorovian structure shows two necessary
effects: (1) the interaction with the measurement context changes the state of the system; and
(2) there is a lack of knowledge on the way these measurements influence the state of the
mechanical system, and hence on the interaction between the measurement context and the
system. The existence of a lack of knowledge on measurements that change the state of the
entity under study is abundantly present in many macroscopic situations (Aerts 1982, 1986;
Czachor 1992). Much more so than in cases of macroscopic mechanical systems involving
measurements that show these two effects, this type of situation will occur naturally with
entities that are the common subjects of scientific disciplines in what we know as the human
sciences, such as psychology and sociology, since both these effects are typical of the
majority of measurements carried out in these fields. This is why it is plausible that non-
Kolmogorovian probability structures will be encountered in those layers of reality where the
two above effects are present, more specifically in the psycho-cognitive layer of reality.
3. Quantum structures and the human mind
In this section we will discuss the different ways in which we have identified quantum-like
structures in the psycho-cognitive layer, where the (measurement) context is crucial.
3.1. Modelling decision processes
The first situation that we analysed in this way is that of psychological decision processes,
where subjects are influenced by, and form part of their opinions during the testing process
(Aerts and Aerts 1994, 1997; Aerts 1995). We have set out to prove that the probability
model encountered in these situations is non-Kolmogorovian. Let us consider the simple
situation of an opinion poll, because here the cause of the non-Kolmogorovian structure can
be seen intuitively. Let us suppose the survey contains the following question: “Are you in
favour or against the legalisation of soft drugs?” The respondents will comprise (1) those that
were already in favour before being asked the question; (2) those that were already against
before they are asked; and (3) those that were neither in favour nor against before being
asked, and make up their opinion in the course of the survey. It is the state of mind of the
respondents in the latter group that will be affected by the measurement context (the manner
in which the survey is conducted, but also all the details about the environmental situation
during the survey), while moreover we lack knowledge on the exact nature of this change of
state. These are the two effects that turn the probability model into a non-Kolmogorovian
model (Aerts and Aerts 1994, 1997; Aerts 1995).
We should point out the following here. Social scientists studying situations that involve
opinion polls are of course very much aware of the existence of a subgroup of respondents
that have no opinion before they are asked to answer the questions. This is usually resolved
by including the answer no opinion or don’t know, next to in favour and against. A quantum
model behaves differently. In a quantum model, the introduction of such a third outcome –
comparable to the outcome no opinion – does not offer an adequate solution. There will still
be a group that does not fit in with any of the three alternatives offered, because they do not
allow classification along these lines prior to the survey. These respondents did not decide to
vote for the third no opinion outcome (which would make them have an opinion after all).
Their mind is literally made up during the survey itself, and hence classifying them as having
no opinion prior to the survey would be equally erroneous. There is another aspect we wish
to point out. Although ad hoc models are made in the field of social sciences for these
situations, all these models extract the statistical analysis that they use from classical
statistics. Classical statistics is a mathematical theory that is built on the mathematical
foundation of a Kolmogorovian probability model. Stating that the probability model
involved is non-Kolmogorovian is equal to stating that classical statistics does not apply in
this situation.
3.2. Modelling concepts
If decision processes entail a quantum-like structure it is plausible that other structures
directly connected to the functioning of the human mind equally contain quantum structure.
In this respect we were triggered to investigate one of the old and unsolved problems in
concept research, called the pet-fish problem. The pet-fish problem is encountered in concept
research when mathematical models for single concepts (pet and fish in this case) are
tempted to be combined mathematically to give rise to a model for the combined concept
(pet-fish in this case). How to do this is a long standing open problem in concept research.
We were able to solve the pet-fish problem by explicitly using a quantum mechanical
mathematical representation for concepts (Aerts and Gabora in press/ab). Let us sketch in
more detail the nature of this solution.
Following the classical theory of semantic concepts, there is for each concept a set of
defining properties that are necessary and sufficient for category membership. Essential
shortcomings of this theory have been identified in many ways (Smith and Medin 1981;
Komatsu 1992). A fundamental step forward was taken in the seventies, under the influence
of the work of Eleanor Rosch and her collaborators at Berkeley. They showed that the
typicality of exemplars of a concept and the application values of properties vary. For
example, an apple, which is an exemplar of the concept fruit is a more typical exemplar than
a pineapple, and juicy has a higher application value as a property of the concept fruit than
the property expensive has for the concept fruit. Rosch formulated the prototype theory: each
concept has a prototype and the typicality of an exemplar depends on how similar it is to the
prototype (Rosch 1975, 1978, 1983; Rosch and Mervis 1975). The breakthrough was that a
concept appears as a fuzzy structure, where similarity becomes the measure. A variety of
models were proposed, and next to the ones inspired by the prototype idea, the exemplar
theories became a second important class. In this category it is not the prototype but salient
exemplars that serve as reference; typicality and application value are measured as the
distance to these exemplars (Nosofsky 1988, 1992; Heit and Barsalou 1996). These theories
yield satisfactory predictions in the case of experiments with single concepts for many
dependent variables, including typicality ratings4 and exemplar generation frequencies 5.
However, problems arise when it comes to combinations of concepts, for these theories do
not allow to account for phenomena such as the so-called guppy effect, where guppy is not
rated as a good example of pet nor of fish, but it is rated as a good example of pet-fish
(Osherson and Smith 1981). General fuzzy set theory has been tried in vain to deliver a
description of the guppy effect (Osherson and Smith 1982; Zadeh 1982), and this peculiarity
can also be understood intuitively: if (1) activation of pet causes a small activation of guppy,
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and (2) activation of fish causes a small activation of guppy, how is it that (3) activation of
pet-fish causes a large activation of guppy?
The combination problem is considered so serious that it has been said that not much
progress will be possible in the field as long as no light is shed on this problem (Fodor 1994;
Kamp and Partee 1995; Rips 1995; Hampton 1997). As a consequence, existing theories
concentrate on attempts to model the combination of at most two concepts (red apple, fake
diamond, car-seat, brain-storm, pet-fish, etc.), while the real challenge consists in modelling
a sentence, or a set of sentences. Our quantum mechanical theory for concepts models an
arbitrary combination of concepts, including combinations consisting of more than two
concepts, and it also describes the guppy effect by making use of the standard quantum
mechanical procedure to describe the combinations of quantum entities. We show the
quantum effect called entanglement to be at the origin of the guppy effect (Aerts and Gabora
in press/ab; Gabora and Aerts 2002a,b). Entanglement is one of the characteristic properties
of quantum entities. If two quantum entities are entangled it means that a change of state of
one of the quantum entities provokes a corresponding change of state of the other quantum
entity. It can be proven that if there would be a physical process carrying this change of state
correlation, then this physical process is neither a causal nor a local process. In the quantum
model for concepts that we worked out, different concepts in a combination (e.g. a sentence)
of these concepts are entangled in the sense that if one of the concepts collapses to one of its
exemplars (changes its state), also the other concept undergoes a change of state. We refer to
section 4 where we consider the sentence The pet eats the food, and where in the process of
violating Bell’s inequalities we consider different situations where it can be seen how a
change of state of pet induces a change of state of food and vice versa, pet and food being
two entangled concepts within the sentence The pet eats the food. The guppy effect is due to
the fact that, as a consequence of entanglement, the contextual influence on one of the
concepts of a combination of concepts also influences the other concepts in this combination.
Literally, if in the combination pet-fish, the pet becomes a guppy, then also the fish becomes
a guppy, because pet and fish are entangled in the combination pet-fish.
3.3. Concepts and sentences versus sources and data
The main impact of Bell’s work was that it shifted the analysis of hidden variables from
philosophical speculations to experiment. Bell’s inequalities deliver a criterion that allows
investigating the probabilistic and logical structure of a source on the basis of the data it
produces. The data are represented by sequences of symbols and are as ordinary or classical
as the characters used to write this article. Bell’s inequalities constitute a statistical test
investigating correlations between different groups of symbols, and the probability model
employed in the analysis is the usual model based on the frequencies of occurrence of certain
results. However, and this is one of the ingenious elements of the Bell analysis, certain
frequencies are impossible if the source is characterised by a Kolmogorovian model of
probability, or – which is roughly equivalent – by a Boolean logic6. Again, it should be borne
in mind that the goal of the Bell statistical test is to reveal a non-Kolmogorovian hidden
structure of a source.
The above situation is strikingly similar to that encountered in the investigation of logical
structures behind language. A speaker or author is a source, the structures that are the subject
of investigation refer to the conceptual level and are as hidden as von Neumann’s hidden
variables, but the data produced by the source are collections of symbols contained in a
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mathematical structure of a Boolean algebra, carrying the traditional logical operations of conjunction,
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computer memory or on a piece of paper. Quantitative linguistics is the field to look for
theoretical tools.
When working on the modelling of concepts, and with our approach having allowed us to
model an entire sentence as a combination of the concepts contained in this sentence (Aerts
and Gabora in press/ab), we stumbled rather by accident on articles on the World Wide Web
proposing mathematical models for text fragments, more specifically, articles on Latent
Semantic Analysis (LSA)7, many of which have been made available through the web by
Thomas Landauer’s team at the university of Boulder (http://lsa.colorado.edu/). We saw that
the mathematical models used were vector space models, which was quite a surprise, since
our quantum model is also a vector space model (a Hilbert space, the principal mathematical
structure used in quantum mechanics, is a vector space).
Meanwhile, we know that there are different approaches to modelling language on
mathematical models, and that most of them use vector spaces as principal mathematical
entities. The prominent examples of such approaches are Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA)
(Deerwester, Dumais, Furnas, et al. 1990; Landauer, Foltz and Laham 1998), Hyperspace
Analogue to Language (HAL) (Lund and Burgess 1996), Probabilistic Latent Semantic
Analysis (pLSA) (Hofmann 1999), Latent Dirichlet Allocation (Blei, Ng and Jordan Michael
2003) or Topic Model (Griffiths and Steyvers 2004). These methods are based on text co-
occurrence matrices and data-analysis techniques employing singular value decomposition8.
For example, LSA provides a powerful method for determining similarity of meaning of
words and passages by analysis of large text corpora. Quite impressive results have been
obtained from experiments simulating human performance. For example, LSA-programmed
machines proved capable of passing multiple-choice exams such as a Test of English as a
Foreign Language (TOEFL) – (after receiving training in general English) (Landauer and
Dumais 1997) and, after learning from an introductory psychology textbook, a final exam for
psychology students (Landauer 2002).
In (Aerts and Czachor 2004) we explored the structural similarities between these vector
space models for language and the Hilbert space model of quantum mechanics. Similarities
of mathematical structures between quantum mechanics, and quantum logic and quantum
information theory in particular, on the one hand, and those employed in LSA on the other,
opened new perspectives for both LSA and the traditional quantum fields of interest. Certain
structures quite natural in the quantum domains might help to clarify the difficulties of LSA.
One of the first links we noticed was the bag-of-words problem of LSA. In LSA a text
passage is treated as a bag of words, a set where order is irrelevant (Landauer, Laham and
Foltz 1998). This is considered to be a serious problem because even on the intuitive level it
will be clear that syntax is important to evaluating the meaning of text. The sentences Mary
hits John and John hits Mary cannot be distinguished by LSA. The problem is basically how
to order words in using vector models. In quantum theories, the problem was solved a long
                                                 
7 In LSA, texts are mapped into co-occurrence matrices. Columns and rows of the matrices represent sentences
and words, respectively. Scalar products between word-vectors (i.e. rows of text matrices) measure similarity of
meaning. LSA recognises that two different words have similar meanings. The procedure is automatic.
Computers can learn by themselves and pass multiple-choice exams without any real understanding of the test
material. Search engines based on LSA can find texts related to a given term even if this term does not occur in
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8 Singular value decomposition  is a representation of a matrix in the form of a product of three matrices. The
middle matrix is diagonal and the elements on the diagonal are termed the singular values. For example, in
applications to picture analysis, one cannot practically distinguish between two pictures whose singular values
differ by small numbers. Therefore, one of the ways of compressing pictures is by setting small diagonal values
to zero and keeping only the values that are sufficiently large. Sufficient here is determined by the intended
sharpness of the picture. The same idea can be applied to any data that is stored as matrices – texts, for example.
time ago in terms of tensor structures9. Quantum experiments confirming the violation of
Bell’s inequalities in fact aimed to test the presence of tensor structures in the non-
Kolmogorovian model of quantum mechanical probability. In principle, analogous analyses
performed on text corpora might reveal non-classical structures in their sources, i.e. the
minds of their authors. The idea may seem exotic, but it is not that far from other
mathematical techniques employed in quantitative linguistics, and whose roots are in physics.
One can mention here the Zipf-Mandelbrot criterion10 for natural languages and its
generalisations resulting from non-extensive thermodynamics11 and applied to Shakespeare’s
writings in (Montemurro 2001) and (Czachor and Naudts 2002).
Still, the possible influences go in both directions. The tools and experiences developed
within LSA might open new perspectives on semantics of quantum programming languages,
the languages necessary for programming quantum computers. Moreover, once we realised
that tensor structures might form a common basis for quantum information and logic on the
one hand, and semantic analysis on the other, we found links to still another field that had
been developing independently during the past 15 years or so: distributed representations of
cognitive structures in symbolic AI and neural networks12. To our surprise, we realised that
tensor products were already employed in certain AI investigations (Smolensky 1990), and
that certain alternatives to tensors had been extensively investigated in this context (Plate
2003). These structures seem unknown to the quantum information community and might
prove to be of crucial importance in quantum memory models. We also mention that
Widdows and Peters (2003) have investigated connections between LSA and quantum
logical structures.
At the moment we are at a crossroads of at least three highly and independently
developed fields of knowledge: Quantum information, semantic analysis, and symbolic AI.
We are convinced that quantum probabilistic and logical structures will prove essential in the
latter two domains, and it is even difficult to imagine in what direction further development
will continue.
4. The violation of Bell’s inequalities in language and its implications for EE
In this section we will present an example of how Bell’s inequalities are violated if we apply
the model developed for the representation of concepts to language (Aerts and Gabora, in
press/ab). From what we explained in chapter 2, this proves that language contains genuine
quantum structure.
4.1. Concepts as entities in different states under different contexts
According to Rosch, the typicality of different exemplars of one and the same concept
varies (Rosch 1975, 1978, 1983; Rosch and Mervis 1975). Subjects rate different
typicalities for exemplars of the concept fruit, for example, resulting in a classification
                                                 
9 Tensor structures  are a generalisation of ordinary multiplication that can be applied not only to numbers but
also to vectors, matrices, etc. In vector models of probability and logic, the tensor product represents logical
conjunction (AND). Tensor structures are all the structures that can be obtained by tensor products of more
primitive objects.
10 In a text we can count the number of times a given word occurs, and repeat this procedure for all the words in
the text. We can then produce a decreasing curve representing the frequency of occurrence of all the words,
starting with the most frequent one. The Zipf-Mandelbrot criterion is a condition on the shape of this curve that
allows identifying a text written in a natural language.
11 Non-extensive thermodynamics  is a statistical method of finding probability distributions that are optimal in
some sense and characteristic of finite sets of data with long-range correlations. Texts written in natural
languages possess such correlations due to syntax, grammar and other linguistic features.
12 Distributed representations are models that take into account the need for information to be represented in a
pattern of activation over a set of neurons, in which each concept is represented by activation over multiple
neurons, and each neuron participates in the representation of  multiple concepts.
with decreasing typicality, such as apple, strawberry, plum, pineapple, fig, olive.
According to our theory of concepts, for each exemplar alone the typicality of varies with
the context that influences it (Aerts and Gabora, in press/ab). By analogy, for each
property alone, the application value varies with the context. We performed an experiment
to point out and measure our typicality and application value effect. Participants in the
experiment classified exemplars of the concept pet under different contexts resulting in
typicality ratings given in Table 1.
Exemplar The pet is
chewing a bone
The pet is
being taught
Look what a pet he has, I knew
he was a weird person
rabbit 0.07 2.52 1.77
cat 3.96 4.80 0.94
mouse 0.74 2.27 3.31
bird 0.42 3.06 1.41
parrot 0.53 5.80 1.57
goldfish 0.12 0.69 0.83
hamster 0.85 2.72 1.25
canary 0.26 2.73 0.86
guppy 0.14 0.68 0.83
snake 0.57 0.98 5.64
spider 0.26 0.40 5.96
dog 6.81 6.78 0.91
hedgehog 0.53 0.85 3.48
guinea pig 0.58 2.63 1.31
Table 1 Typicality ratings of different exemplars for different contexts.
The context the pet is chewing a bone results in a classification with certain typicality ratings
which changes when another context is applied, e.g. the context the pet is being taught. It
changes again for the context look what a pet he has, I knew he was a weird person. The
effect was also measured for the application value of a property, as can be seen in table 4  of
Aerts and Gabora (in press/ab). The main idea of our concepts theory is to describe this
typicality and application value effect by introducing the notion of state of a concept, and
hence to consider a concept as an entity that can be in different states, such that a context will
provoke a change in the state of the concept (Aerts and Gabora, in press/ab). Concretely, the
state of the concept pet in the context the pet is chewing a bone is different from the state of
pet in the context look what kind of pet he has, I knew he was a weird person. It is this being
in different states that gives rise to the differences in values for the typicalities of different
exemplars and applications of different properties. It is the set of these states and the
dynamics of change of state under the influence of context corresponding to experimental
data that is modelled by our quantum mechanical formalism in Hilbert space. The problem of
the combination of concepts is resolved in our theory because in combination, the concepts
are in different states; for example, in the combination pet-fish, the concept pet is in a state
under the context the pet is a fish, while the concept fish is in a state under the context the
fish is a pet. The states of pet and fish under these contexts have different typicalities, which
explains the guppy effect (Aerts and Gabora, in press/ab).
4.2. Two pets that eat their favourite food and violate Bell’s inequalities
Rather than begin by presenting a theoretical exposition of Bell’s inequalities, we will
introduce the inequalities along with the example discussed, and point out where they are
violated. Again, our aim is to prove the presence of quantum structure in language.
Let us assume the following overall context. Amy and Carol, two sisters, both have a pet.
Carol has a cat called Felix, and Amy has a dog with the name Roller. The cat and the dog
live together with the two sisters, and get along well. They even do not mind to eat together
in the same room. But of course, they eat different food, and they both are somewhat special,
in that they both have one unique food brand that they prefer above all the rest. For Felix this
is Eukanuba, a well-known brand of cat food, while for Roller this is Royal Canin, a famous
brand of dog food. This means that in practice whenever Felix eats, she eats Eukanuba food,
and whenever Roller eats, he eats Royal Canin. For a reason that is not completely clear to
Amy and Carol they never touch each others’ food. One more aspect, Amy and Carol can
distinguish very well the food that is served in the room where the eating happens, because
Eukanuba and Royal Canin have completely different smells.
Amy and Carol are both playing outside in the garden. The feeding room for the cat and
dog is a room that opens onto the garden, but they are playing in a part of the garden where
they cannot really see what is happening inside the room. They are however aware that one
of the pets is being fed by their mom.
We will now take the sentence The pet eats the food as our conceptual entity, and denote
it by p. The sentence is a combination of concepts, i.e. the three concepts pet, eat and food.
The contexts considered are the following:
e: Hey, I think it is Roller who is eating, because I saw him just get in. (pronounced by
Amy)
f: I believe that the food that mom served is Eukanuba, because I think I smell it.
(pronounced by Carol)
g: One of our pets is eating one of the foods. (thought by both)
The contexts e and f are genuine contexts, i.e. they affect the state of the conceptual entity
The pet eats the food if applied to it. More specifically, context e affects the concept pet, for
if we write (e, p) or, in words: Hey, I think it is Roller who is eating, because I saw him just
get in. The pet eats the food, the concept pet of the sentence The pet eats the food, is changed
into Roller, and the sentence becomes Roller eats the food. Because of the overall contexts,
the concept food in the sentence The pet eats the food will be affected too. Indeed, because
Roller only eats Royal Canin, the concept food changes to Royal Canin, and the sentence The
pet eats the food changes to Roller eats Royal Canin.
In a similar way, we can consider (p, f) or, in words: The pet eats the food. I believe that
the food that mom served is Eukanuba, because I think I smell it. The context f affects the
concept food of the sentence The pet eats the food, in the sense that food changes to
Eukanuba. Hence the sentence The pet eats the food changes to The pet eats Eukanuba.
Because of the overall context, the concept pet is also affected by the context f. The concept
pet changes to Felix, because it is only Felix who eats Eukanuba. Hence the sentence The pet
eats the food changes to Felix eats Eukanuba, under the influence of context f.
Context g is rather a trivial context. Both girls know that one of the pets is being fed
with one of the foods. This means that it affects neither the concept pet nor the concept food
nor the sentence the pet eats the food.
To introduce Bell’s inequalities into our discussion, we will have to associate
numbers with effects of different contexts. For this purpose, we will consider the effects of
the contexts e, f and g on the sentence p, and define E(e, p) = +1, if it is Roller who is eating,
while E(e, p) = -1, if it is Felix who is eating. Furthermore, we define E(p, f) = +1, if the food
eaten is Eukanuba, and E(p, f) = -1, if the food eaten is Royal Canin. Similarly, E(g, p) = +1,
if one of the foods is eaten by one of the pets, and E(g, p) = -1, if it is not so that one of the
foods is eaten by one of the pets. Lastly, E(p, g) = +1, if one of the foods is eaten by one of
the pets, and E(p, g) = -1, if it is not so that one of the foods is eaten by one of the pets.
Bell’s inequalities come into play when we consider situations that vary with
changing pairs of contexts for the sentence The pet eats the food, with one of the pairs of
contexts affecting the concept pet in sentence p, and the other affecting the concept food in
sentence p. More specifically, it is the four following combinations of pairs of contexts
together with sentence p that is considered in Bell’s inequalities.
(1) The pair of contexts e and f with p, such that e affects pet and f affects food. This is
represented in symbols as (e, p, f) and in words as Hey, I think it is Roller who is eating,
because I saw him just get in. The pet eats the food. I believe that the food that mom served is
Eukanuba, because I think I smell it.
(2) The pair of contexts e and g with p, such that e affects pet and g affects food. This is
represented in symbols as (e, p, g) and in words as Hey, I think it is Roller who is eating,
because I saw him just get in. The pet eats the food. One of our pets is eating one of the
foods.
(3) The pair of context g and f with p, such that g affects pet and f affects food. This is
represented in symbols as (g, p, f) and in words as One of our pets is eating one of the foods.
The pet eats the food. I believe that the food that mom served is Eukanuba, because I think I
smell it.
(4) The pair of contexts g and g on p, such that g affects pet and g affects food. This is
represented in symbols as (g, p, g) and in words as One of our pets is eating one of the foods.
The pet eats the food. One of our pets is eating one of the foods.
We will now have to associate numbers with the effects of the contexts on these four
combinations. Thus, we define E(e, p, f) = +1 if it is Roller who eats Eukanuba, or if it is
Felix who eats Royal Canin. Similarly, E(e, p, f) = -1 if it is Roller who eats Royal Canin or
if it is Felix who eats Eukanuba. We define E(e, p, g) = +1 if it is Roller who eats one of the
foods, and E(e, p, g) = -1 if it is Felix who eats one of the foods. E(g, p, f) = +1 if it is one of
the pets who eats Eukanuba, and E(g, p, f) = -1 if it is one of the pets who eats Royal Canin.
Lastly, we have E(g, p, g) = +1 if one of the pets eats one of the foods, and E(g, p, g) = -1 if it
is not so that one of the pets eats one of the foods.
Bell’s inequalities are the following:
|E(e, p, f) - E(e, p, g)| + | E(g, p, f) + E(g, p, g)| ≤ +2
Bell’s inequalities are violated whenever we have:
|E(e, p, f) - E(e, p, g)| + | E(g, p, f) + E(g, p, g)| > +2
Let us see what this gives in our situation.
(1) Case (e, p, f)
Amy seems to believe that it is Roller who is eating, but Carol believes that the food is
Eukanuba. This means that there are three possibilities. (A) Roller is eating Royal Canin and
hence Carol is mistaken about the food. (B) Felix is eating Eukanuba, and hence Amy is
mistaken about which pet is eating. (C) Perhaps a new uncommon event occurred, and Roller
is eating the cat food. In case A and case B, we have E(e, p, f) = -1. In case C, we have E(e,
p, f) = +1.
(2) Case (e, p, g)
Amy believes that Roller is eating, and since the context is g, there is no reason to doubt
her. Certainly one of the pets is eating one of the foods. Hence E(e, p, g) = (+1)
(3) Case (g, p, f)
Carol believes that the food is Eukanuba. In this case too there is no reason to doubt her.
Certainly one of the pets is eating one of the foods. Hence E(g, p, f) = +1.
(4) Case (g, p, g)
One of the pets is eating one of the foods, hence E(g, p, g) = +1.
Let us suppose that it is certain that we are dealing with either case A or case B (thus
ruling out the option of Roller’s having made a move to eat cat food). In this case we have:
|E(e, p, f) - E(e, p, g)| + | E(g, p, f) + E(g, p, g)| = |-1 -1| + |+1 +1| = +4
i.e. an extreme violation of Bell’s inequalities (indeed, it is the maximum violation).
The more we allow the possibility of case C happening, the less will be the extent of the
violation of Bell’s inequalities. Yet a real experiment in which the participants are presented
with a situation in which the context is explained to them and they are asked to rate their
assessments of what is really happening by giving numbers +1 and -1, would still result in a
violation of Bell’s inequalities, albeit not to the maximum extent of +4. The reason for this is
that some of the participants would believe case C to be taking place, rather than suppose that
one of the girls is mistaken.
4.3. The violation of Bell’s inequalities in language
Before we start to analyze the violation of Bell’s inequalities we wish to make the following
remark. Suppose that we have the following product equalities:
E(e, p, f) = E(e, p) E(p, f)
E(e, p, g) = E(e, p) E(p, g)
E(g, p, f) = E(g, p) E(p, f)
E(g, p, g) = E(g, p) E(p, g)
In this case we have:
|E(e, p, f) - E(e, p, g)| + | E(g, p, f) + E(g, p, g)|
= | E(e, p) E(p, f) - E(e, p) E(p, g)| + | E(g, p) E(p, f) + E(g, p) E(p, g)|
= | E(e, p) (E(p, f) - E(p, g))| + | E(g, p) (E(p, f) + E(p, g))|
= | E(e, p) | | E(p, f) - E(p, g) | + | E(g, p) | | E(p, f) + E(p, g) |
The fact that E(e, p) = +1 or E(e, p) = -1 implies that | E(e, p) | = +1, and similarly | E(g,
p) | = +1, hence:
= | E(p, f) - E(p, g) | + | E(p, f) + E(p, g) |
The fact that E(p, f) = +1 or E(p, f) = -1, and E(p, g) = + 1 or E(p, g) = -1, yields
| E(p, f) - E(p, g) | = 0 or | E(p, f) - E(p, g) | = +2, and also | E(p, f) + E(p, g) | = 0 or | E(p,
f) + E(p, g) | = +2, and clearly if | E(p, f) - E(p, g) | = 0 then | E(p, f) + E(p, g) | = +2, while if
| E(p, f) - E(p, g) | = +2 then | E(p, f) + E(p, g) | = 0, which proves that
| E(p, f) - E(p, g) | + | E(p, f) + E(p, g) | = +2
This proves that in this case Bell’s inequalities are never violated. This means that any
violation of Bell’s inequalities requires a violation of at least one of the product equalities. In
our example of the two pets eating their favourite food, we have
E(e, p, f) ≠ E(e, p) E(p, f)
Indeed, E(e, p) = +1, because Roller is the one who is eating (because of what Amy has
seen), and E(p, f) = +1, because it is Eukanuba that is being eaten (because of what Carol
smells), but E(e, p, f) = -1, because the overall context makes it very probable that one of the
girls is mistaken.
What does all this show?
(i) The origin of the violation is the fact that in the sentence The pet eats the food the
concepts pet and food are entangled. More concretely, this means that when the concept cat
collapses to Felix, the concept food collapses to the food that Felix is eating. We formulated
the overall contexts in such a way that this collapse is well defined, so that if pet collapses to
Felix, then food collapses to Eukanuba. In the overall contexts of the world at large, this
entanglement will not be so neatly defined. Even so, the fact is that if pet collapses to a
specific pet, the food collapses to a specific food, namely the food that this specific pet eats.
This underlying mechanism of entanglement is the mechanism that carries the meaning of the
sentence The pet eats the food, and it is this which makes this sentence different from just the
bag of words {pet, eat, food}. That the tensor product can be used to describe this
entanglement, exactly as it is done in quantum mechanics, is shown explicitly in (Aerts and
Gabora in press/ab), where the full quantum mathematical description in Hilbert space is
worked out for the sentence The cat eats the food.
(ii) The violation also requires aspects of language that are not purely logical. It does play
a role that we have constructed a situation where the meaning of a particular combination of
sentences allows concluding that one of the two girls must be mistaken. This would not be
the case if we reduced the situation to a set of logical propositions. In this respect it is worth
noting the following: Bell’s inequalities are violated because in case (e, p, f) it is plausible
that one of the two girls is mistaken, and that it is not Roller who is eating cat food. Of
course, also in cases (e, p, g) and (g, p, f) it is quite possible that one of the girls is mistaken.
But language functions in such a way that this possibility will be much less taken into
account, because there is no reason to believe that one of the girls is mistaken in these
situations, whereas there is in situation (e, p, f), which is contradictory, given the assumption
that Roller never eats cat food.
(iii) We might be tempted to believe, taking into account our remark in (ii), that
violations of Bell’s inequalities in language are strictly linked to contradictory situations.
This is not true, however. The contradiction per se is of no importance. What is important is
that the effect of context e on sentence p (and more specifically on the concept pet as part of
sentence p) depends on whether it is context f that affects sentence p (and more specifically
the concept food as part of sentence p) or context g that affects sentence p (and more
specifically the concept food as part of sentence p). If this is the case, we have
E(e, p, f) ≠ E(e, p) E(p, f)
with a violation of Bell’s inequalities being possible. Our example contains a
contradiction (one of the two girls is mistaken) only for the sake of making a clear case
without having to perform real experiments on subjects. Although it is obvious that the effect
may well be less strong in other contexts, it will still be there, so that we can say that any
such other contexts will still give rise to a violation of Bell’s inequalities.
We had presented in earlier work a situation where Bell’s inequalities are violated in
cognition (Aerts, Aerts, Broekaert et al. 2000). However the situation considered there
introduced conceptual as well as physical contexts, and hence cannot be reduced easily to a
purely linguistic situation, as the one considered in the present article.
4.4. The implications for Evolutionary Epistemology
Section 3 outlined the presence of quantum structures in decision processes and concept
structures. Section 4 presented an explicit violation of Bell’s inequalities in language,
demonstrating the presence of non-Kolmogorovian probability structure in language. Section
2 pointed out that the mathematical models of Markov chains, used to describe the neo-
Darwinian mechanism of evolution through variation and selection, is built upon a
Kolmogorovian probability model. Technically, this follows from the fact that Markov
processes are formulated using a probability structure that is defined on a σ-algebra of
events13, and this σ-algebra of events makes the probability model Kolmogorovian. Neo-
Darwinian evolution is modelled in this way, because this is the natural way to model a
mechanism of variation and selection on a set of actualised entities, be they phenotypes or
genes or other units of evolution. The fact that Bell’s inequalities are violated means that the
probability structure involved is non-Kolmogorovian, and hence that evolution cannot be
modelled using Markov processes. In Aerts, Czachor, Gabora, et al. (2003), we designed a
global mathematical evolution model that incorporates non-Kolmogorovian probabilities. We
are currently elaborating this approach by focusing on non-Kolmogorovian models for a
replicator dynamics. We are well aware of the highly abstract nature of our criticism of the
neo-Darwinian evolution scheme as it stands now. In this sense, it is not obvious whether it
can lead to new insights or solutions to some of the well-known problems regarding neo-
Darwinian evolution. In view of this, we will outline what we expect might result once we
have elaborated much more sophisticated models. Our experience with the effects of
quantum models when used in the realm of the micro-world allows us to formulate these
expectations in some detail. Of course, the correctness of this speculation depends on how
complete the quantum structure of which we have detected aspects is present in the macro-
world, more specifically in its psycho-cognitive layer.
A first aspect of quantum change that we should mention is the following. There are
two types of change: the one is called collapse, defined as the change under the influence of a
specific and nearby context. The other change is called dynamical change, which is defined
as a change, not under the influence of a specific nearby context, but rather as the
consequence of the global interaction with the rest of the universe. A second aspect to
mention is that there are also two types of state with respect to a specific context of the
entities involved in evolution. There is a type of state called an eigenstate, by which is meant
a state where the entity is actualised with respect to this context; more specifically, it is the
state the entity is in after it has undergone a collapse type of change under the influence of
this context. The second type of state is called a superposition state. This is a state that is not
actualised with respect to this context, hence it is a potentiality state (Aerts and D’Hooghe in
press). If it is in such a superposition state, and under the influence of this context, the entity
will collapse to one of the eigenstates with a certain probability.
Let us give an example of the type of situation that we think can be described using
this formalism. Suppose we consider again the cat food Eukanuba of section 4.2. Of course,
                                                 
13 A σ-algebra is a Boolean algebra that is σ-complete, meaning that denumerable infinite conjunctions and
disjunctions of events are allowed, while in a Boolean algebra only finite conjunctions and disjunctions are
allowed.
there are many other brands of cat food on the market, for instance Purina, Sophistacat, Bil-
Jac, Iams, Whiskas and Friskies. All of these existing cat food brands are competing on the
same North-American market. This is a good example of where in a rather obvious way the
neo-Darwinian scheme can be applied. Indeed, some of the brands can be fitter than the
others, and if the difference in fitness is too big, the non-fit ones will disappear from the
market. All these seven brands are actualized entities with respect to the context, i.e. the
North-American market. But what about the situation where a new company plans to market
a new brand of cat food? Probably there is a particular time-frame in which the new brand
exists only in the planning phase: the plans to market the brand are there, and become more
and more concrete, but the brand is not yet an actualized entity in the market. In our quantum
formalism, we will describe this new brand as being in a superposition state with respect to
the context, which is the North-American market, while an actualized brand is in an
eigenstate with respect to this context. Of course, in this superposition state (potentiality
state), the brand will already be subject to evolution, as the plans evolve. But they evolve in
the realms of the interacting minds of the designers, engineers, chemists and marketers that
are in the planning of the new brand. The effect of the market on this superposition state is a
collapse-type of change; indeed, slowly but definitely the plans for the new brand of cat food
change towards an actualization of a new brand on the market. Following its actualization, it
will then openly compete with the other brands, which have already been actualized.
Now there are some interesting questions to ask. For example, is there already
competition in the superposition phase of evolution? Certainly there is. Indeed, to see this
clearly, we just have to consider a situation that is somewhat more complex. Let us suppose
that there are two companies considering the introduction of a new brand of cat food. If they
know of each other’s intentions, there certainly will already be competition in the planning or
superposition phase. And, of course, there will also be competition between the not yet
actualized brands - the brands in the planning phase, hence in a superposition state - and the
already actualized brands, in an eigenstate. It might well be that some of the actualized
brands temporarily withdraw to the superposition state again, to allow for plans to be made
for adjusting to the newcomers on the market. Our expectation is that all of this possible
dynamics will be readily described by a quantum evolution scheme.
The final remark we wish to make concerning EE is the most speculative one, but it is
too interesting to be left out. We believe that, with regard to EE, things should be seen in
exactly the opposite way. Biological evolution should not be taken as a metaphor for
epistemological and conceptual change. It is epistemological and conceptual change that
should be taken as a metaphor for biological evolution. We do believe that the change that
we readily see happening in front of our eyes in the conceptual, cultural, psychological and
social realities around us – let us call this EE-type of evolution – is the more general one,
with biological evolution being the more specific one, in some sense a special case of the EE-
type evolution. That is why we believe that there are quantum aspects to biological evolution
too, although they are much less obvious than the ones we have identified in EE-type of
evolution. Let us consider for a moment in this respect one of the biggest problems
encountered in biological evolution: the gaps in the fossil records. Now if we were to
suppose that biological evolution is quantum-like, we might argue that in this case only
actualized life forms, hence life forms in collapsed states with respect to the context – the
earth’s environment –, give rise to fossils, and that a not yet detected undercurrent reality
exists, where life forms in superposition states evolve and interact with each other, without
ever giving rise to fossils. In this undercurrent of reality, life forms would thus exist in
potentiality states, albeit potentiality states that could collapse to an actualized life form, but
not necessarily so. These non actualized life-forms evolve under a similar type of evolution
as the one that governs epistemological and conceptual entities, which means that they could
give rise to new non-actualized life forms, without leaving traces in the context which is the
earth’s environment. This would explain the gaps in the fossil records and the sudden
appearance of new life forms as a natural phenomenon, the equivalent of the sudden
appearance of a new brand of cat food on the North-American market, after the brand has
evolved in the planning phase within the human minds that are engaged in its planning.
5. Conclusion
The neo-Darwinian mechanism of evolution formalized by means of Markov processes on
the level of the phenotypes entails an underlying Kolmogorovian probability model. This
Kolmogorovian structure of the probability model is not just due to an arbitrary choice for a
Markov chain realization of the neo-Darwinian evolution process. The neo-Darwinian accent
on variation and selection as basic mechanisms leads to this Markov formalization, because
variation and selection are considered to function on a set of actualized units of evolution.
We argue in this article that this neo-Darwinian mechanism falls short of describing
evolution, because of its limitation to a Markovian process structure, whenever non-
Kolmogorovian probability structures are present. We describe the different situations in
which we have proved the presence of non-Kolmogorovian probability structure in former
research work, more specifically in human decision processes, in how concepts and
combinations of concepts are structured. In this article we show the presence of non-
Kolmogorovian probability structure in language. Decision processes, concepts and their
combinations, and language, are three situations that appertain to the field that is also
considered by EE. This means that our finding shows that if EE is interpreted narrowly, and
hence attempt to implement the neo-Darwinian mechanism to epistemology, it will stumble
upon the problem of the presence of non-Kolmogorovian probability structures in some of
the situations of the evolution that it attempts to model. Hence this article is an argumentation
for the broad interpretation of EE. More speculatively, we have suggested that it would be
preferable to regard epistemological and conceptual evolution (or rather its generalisation,
which we have called EE-type of evolution – see section 4.4.) as the more general one, and
biological evolution as a special case of it, in the same way as for example quantum
mechanics is the more general type of mechanics, and classical mechanics is a special case of
it. If this line of reasoning is followed with respect to biological evolution, so that also
biological evolution would contain quantum aspects (as we believe it does, and we are
working on a project to corroborate this), we can sketch a speculative scenario that would
provide a natural explanation for the well-known problem in biological evolution of the gap
in the fossil records and the sudden appearance of new life forms (section 4.4.).
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